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This essay is an analysis and expanded defense of John Sutton’s essay “Exograms and Interdisciplinarity: 
History, the Extended Mind, and the Civilizing Process.” The first section of the essay surveys the 
extended mind literature, following the first and second waves of the Extended Mind theory. The second 
section explains Sutton’s exograms as external representations of internal thought. This section also 
details his argument that exograms extend the mind because, historically, exograms play a role in the 
internal functioning of a mind. The third section defends Sutton’s argument from objections against their 
place in mental processes, namely memory. The fourth section argues against the objection that the mind 
cannot be extended beyond the brain, by appealing to a computational view of functionalism. The 
conclusions drawn from the third and fourth sections are that the mind, through language, extends with 







In his essay “Exograms and Interdisciplinarity: History, the Extended Mind, and the 
Civilizing Process,” John Sutton briefly explains two waves of Extended Mind theory. 
He then provides one argument regarding the extension of memory and another 
regarding the extension of cognitive action based on two examples from history. He 
promotes interdisciplinarity in the study of the extended mind, since these examples 
provide insight into what cognitive extension is, showing it is not a novel idea in other 
areas of study. I use Sutton’s concept of exograms to reply to a common objection of 
the extended mind. In the first section, I outline the waves of Extended Mind theory as 
Sutton describes them. In the second section, I illustrate Sutton’s argument of extension 
through exograms. In the third section, I defend the concept of exograms from 
objections against their place in mental processes. In the fourth section, I argue against 
the objection that the mind cannot be extended beyond the brain, by appealing to a 
computational view of functionalism. The conclusions I draw from the third and fourth 
sections are that the mind, through language, extends with culture and that, even in 
cognitive science, it is fruitful to study the mind extended as such. 
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Waves of the Extended Mind Theory 
 
Sutton denotes the first wave of Extended Mind theory as coming from Clark and 
Chalmers’ essay “The Extended Mind,” where they propose that external objects 
extend the mind when they couple with the brain in a cognitive process. The argument, 
following the parity principle, is that, if an object, such as an ever-present notebook, 
plays a functional role in a cognitive process, such as memory, then this object is a part 
of the mind by virtue of being a part of the cognitive process.1 Adams and Aizawa 
criticize this view by asserting that Clark and Chalmers commit a coupling-constitution 
fallacy. Adams and Aizawa argue that just because something is coupled to the process 
does not mean that it is a constitutive part of the process. Pieces which aid a cognitive 
process are not considered cognitive, they maintain, and the mind is not constituted in 
that object.2 For example, an ever present notebook used in the cognitive process does 
not itself make the notebook cognitive nor is it an extension of the mind. Sutton himself 
critiques the parity principle by stating it leaves out many cognitive tools such as 
exograms, a tool to be later explained.3 Sutton positions himself in the second wave. 
 
In the second wave, Clark clarifies Clark and Chalmers’ original argument to avoid the 
coupling-constitution fallacy. He states that something which is coupled in a cognitive 
system is not itself cognitive, much in the same way that a neuron involved in the same 
process is not itself cognitive. Rather, the system created by the coupling is cognitive, 
since functional parts of the process exist outside of the brain (or skin, depending on 
how internal cognition is classified). Thus the mind is extended in this process.4 Sutton 
places himself on the side of this broader view of Extended Mind theory, as it is more 
open to different types of social tools.5 Adams and Aizawa still reject the extended 
mind because the brain (or its equivalent) is still the central processing piece of the 
cognitive system and types of “external cognition” process information in a 
fundamentally different way, such that they lack the “mark of the cognitive.”6 I claim 
later that Sutton’s examples merge the brain with external objects in processing if 





                                                          
1John Sutton, "Exograms and Interdisciplinarity: History, the Extended Mind, and the Civilizing 
Process," The Extended Mind, edited by Richard Menary, (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 
2010), 195. 
2 Fred Adams and Ken Aizawa, "Defending the Bounds of Cognition," The Extended Mind, 
edited by Richard Menary, (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2010), 68. 
3 Sutton, “Exograms,” 200. 
4 Sutton, “Exograms,” 206. 
5 Sutton, “Exograms,” 201. 
6Adams and Aizawa, “Defending the Bounds,” 75. 
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Sutton’s Exograms 
 
Sutton argues that, historically, cognitive processes in regards to memory which 
constitute an extended mind or make an extended mind possible have existed. He 
proposes the concept of an exogram, taken from Merlin Donald, which is an 
externalized engram.7 An engram is a cluster of neurons within the brain which stores a 
memory in neuronal connections. These engrams include their own triggers for 
enacting their memories.8 They work such that, under a sensational prompt from 
outside the head or a conceptual prompt inside the head, a certain grouping of neurons, 
which correspond to a memory, activate and recreate that memory. Sutton argues that 
people export the work of an engram to physical representations in the world, creating 
exograms. 
 
The first example Sutton discusses involves Elizabethan actors. Actors in this time 
period typically had a plethora of roles in different plays within a single month. In 
addition, these actors were given nothing more than their own lines for each role and a 
single prompting cue for each line and entrance (sometimes with no cues for exits). It 
seems implausible that these actors could have learned these roles in such a short 
amount of time by sheer force of memorization or repeated rehearsal. There is also 
evidence that, in an attempt to prevent plagiarism, rehearsals where a director organized 
the entire play at once were rare. Instead, the theaters were conducive to orchestrating 
these plays via a shared cue code placed in the back. With this code learned, all the 
actors could easily act their part in the same unison typically displayed in modern 
productions, where an actor has significantly fewer roles to play and practices over a 
long rehearsal process which includes a director.9  
 
For Sutton, this is evidence that this code creates an exogram for the actors. A symbol 
in the theatre would be put up and it would not correspond simply to meaning. Instead, 
this symbol would prompt the memory of a whole line rehearsed as a distinct role. The 
remarkable part of this code is that it acts as the same trigger for different memories in 
different actors, extending the mind across multiple people.10 In effect, the whole play 
is an exogram, a recreation of a scene or “memory.” Under a single prompt, the players 
will synchronize their words and actions to create something that was unrehearsed, 
making the stage functionally similar to the grouping of neurons firing in synchronicity 
to recreate a memory. 
 
                                                          
7 Sutton, “Exograms,” 189. 
8 Sheena A. Josselyn, Stefan Köhler, and Paul W. Frankland, "Finding the Engram," Nature 
Reviews Neuroscience Volume 16, Number 9 (August, 2015): 521. 
9 Sutton, “Exograms,” 202-204. 
10 Sutton, “Exograms,” 202-204. 
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The second example is the case of the “memory palace.” In Renaissance times, people 
created their own imagined spaces with different rooms. People could then navigate 
their own memory palaces by imagining walking around. In each room, this person 
would store a memory in the form of an imagined static painting or sculpture. 
According to Sutton, a memory palace, or a room in a memory palace, is an engram. 
That these engrams are imagined physical representations lends itself to an exogram 
acting in the same way. People have already used physical representations for internal 
cognition, so these physical representations, if actualized, can be used for external 
cognition.11 
 
Sutton himself is careful with a distinction between the internal and external mind in 
the context of interdisciplinary progress. He claims that the extended mind is, rather 
than an ontological claim, a useful way of looking at humans anthropologically and 
sociologically. He does not privilege the brain as the sole mind, rather minds come in 
different forms.12 He does think there should be a distinction made for the sake of 
cognitive science, but there is no “cognitive mark” unique to internal processes, as 
Adams and Aizawa might put it.13 By stating there we should consider different scales 
of the mind dependent on the disciplinary context, Sutton also avoids an objection of 
overextension of the mind, as it is only as extended as necessary for the explanation. 
 
In Defense of Exograms 
 
In this section, I defend exograms as a method of extending the mind in the style of 
much of the present Extended Mind literature. I argue here that exograms extend the 
mind by functioning similarly to large-scale mental processes. In the next section, I 
outline how exograms function similarly to small-scale brain processes to defend 
against the objection that exograms are not cognitive in the sense that they do not act 
similarly to what we currently regard as cognitive: the brain. Here, I respond to Peter 
Carruthers’ objection that external memories do not originate in conceptual terms as 
internal memories do. I defend exograms by first showing that the order in which 
memory arises does not matter. I then go further by showing that conceptual terms 
themselves originate externally through culture. 
 
Carruthers explores memory in both the sense of working memory, that is memory 
which provides a space for working out arithmetic, and episodic memory, which is the 
memory of past events. He denies the Extended Mind theory in working memory, 
claiming a “mark of the cognitive” style privilege for internal workings, that is working 
memory arises through physically unique processes. His explanation of working 
memory, however, meshes well with Sutton’s example of the memory palace in that it 
                                                          
11 Sutton, “Exograms,” 208-211. 
12 Sutton, “Exograms,” 214. 
13 “Defending the Bounds of Cognition,” 77. 
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is always conscious and sensory.14 So, working memory appears as something external 
even if its contents are internal to the brain. Carruthers’ objection has also been treated 
extensively elsewhere, shifting the focus from parity to the complementary use of 
external objects.15 Sutton advocates for complementarity by suggesting that exograms 
do not pair with a brain. Rather they are used as cognitive tools in ways that can be 
used internally, with memory palaces being the prime example. Internal perceptions in 
the style of external perceptions are used, so the internal nature of these perceptions are 
superficial.16 
 
Carruthers also details episodic memory in a more specific way than Sutton or Sutton’s 
interpretation of Merlin Donald does. Concepts are the first thing drawn in episodic 
memory, that is remembering who “Mary” is begins not with her facial features or other 
sensory details, but with the emotions or concepts associated with the name. According 
to Carruthers, these sorts of things cannot be “experienced” elsewhere and are 
necessarily internal.17 However, exograms are not in contention with this. By Donald’s 
account, even concepts and emotions are coded externally by language, that is the 
experiences are linguistic or heavily influenced by language.18 Nor does the order of 
episodic memory preclude using a photo of Mary to spur on this memory in a 
supposedly backwards way, that is recognizing the face and then thinking of her short 
temper. It is even possible to use an exogramatic code to hasten this by making a 
painting of Mary with heavy usage of the color red.  
 
Moreover, certain views of emotions, like that of the intentionalist, deny that emotions 
are not defined by an internal experience. Rather, emotions are representations of the 
environment. For example, fear is a representation of danger in one’s environment. If a 
bear emerges from the bushes with a thundering roar, the expression of fear is just a 
representation of the danger the bear poses. An intentionalist view supports the 
expression of emotion in external objects, like works of art, without needing to appeal 
to phenomenological experience of emotion.19 Considering that exograms are coded 
representations, they do not have to be restricted to coded memory. Exograms can also 
                                                          
14 Peter Carruthers, The Centered Mind: What the Science of Working Memory Shows Us about 
the Nature of Human Thought, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 197-202. 
15 Andy Clark, “Coupling, Constitution, and the Cognitive Kind: A Reply to Adams and 
Aizawa,” The Extended Mind, edited by Richard Menary, (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 
2010): 81-99. 
16 Sutton, “Exograms,” 209. 
17 Carruthers, The Centered Mind, 75-80. 
18 Merlin Donald, Origins of the Modern Mind: Three Stages in the Evolution of Culture and 
Cognition, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991), 309-319. 
19 Rebecca Copenhaver and Jay Odenbaugh, “Experiencing Emotions: Aesthetics, 
Representationalism, and Expression,” available on Academia.edu: 
http://www.academia.edu/13335567/Experiencing_Emotions_Aesthetics_Representationalism_a
nd_Expression 
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store the emotion of a person and can be reflected in others, much like the emotion is 
reflected in its appearance on the face of the person. 
 
Sutton, in a later paper, even shows that concepts are built contextually in a culturally 
coded way in what is called “scaffolding memory.” Per scaffolding memory, a baby 
learns everything in a cultural context. From the way parents present certain objects, to 
the objects available to them in their environment, all the way down to the milieu of 
basic language in which all these concepts are learned.20 Since a baby learns in a 
cultural context, all concepts must be framed in that context, even the concepts of the 
baby’s culture. 
 
The upshot is that exograms should pave the way to explaining the extended mind of 
entire cultures. Merlin Donald situates exograms in the context of cultural evolution. 
Humans have adapted to making codes, creating representations of ideas using these 
codes, and extracting meaning from these representations. This allows for the storage of 
information for the use of an entire cultural group. This way memory can be stored 
across generations in the form of history.21 History has even been modeled to show 
similarities between it and memory traces, the content of engrams.22 This is essentially 
an evolutionary explanation of semiotics (sign-making), but the use of semiotics as 
‘memory’ in exograms is a useful explanation of the role of semiotics in extended 
cognition. 
 
Sutton’s essay makes a concession to cognitive science by keeping a distinction 
between the internal and the external so we can use different models of mind for 
different disciplines. This distinction is not needed with updated approaches to thinking 
about the brain, a view to which Sutton may be sympathetic. Richard Menary mentions 
that the brain is encultured through using cognitive artifacts, that is the use of cognitive 
tools survives culturally rather than genetically.23 This, in conjunction with the fact that 
codes for exograms are also developed culturally, indicates that any extension of the 
mind is culturally propagated. The brain has evolved to not only make use of social 
tools, but to depend on them. Even Carruthers concedes that language is integral to 
internal thought.24 However, language is culturally determined and interactions within a 
social framework shape how this code is embedded within the brain. Language is not 
simply learned, it shapes thought. 
                                                          
20 John Sutton, “Scaffolding Memory: Themes, Taxonomies, Puzzles,” for forthcoming book 
Contextualizing Human Memory edited by Lucas Bietti and Charlie B. Stone, (Psychology Press, 
September 2014 version). 
21 Donald, Origins, 309-319. 
22 John Heil, "Traces of Things Past," Philosophy of Science, Volume 45, Number 1 (March, 
1978): 60-72. 
23 Richard Menary, "Cognitive Practices and Cognitive Character," Philosophical Explorations 
Volume 15, Number 2 (June, 2012): 147. 
24 Carruthers, The Centered Mind, 75. 
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Using Exograms to Refute the Mark of the Cognitive Privilege 
 
Some objectors to the extended mind theory try to concede that if something is 
functionally equivalent to a brain, then it thinks, and is therefore a mind, while keeping 
some sort of privilege for the internal brain, stating that if something is external to the 
brain, it has no functional equivalence with processes inside the brain. However, we 
can take a computationalist approach to show that some things external to the brain are 
on a fundamental level equivalent to things inside the brain when considering cognitive 
processes.25 We can see the enactment of this concept in exograms. The argument 
against these objections follows simply. (1) If parts of a cognitive process external to 
the brain are functionally equivalent to the parts of a cognitive process inside the brain, 
and those external parts function in conjunction with the internal parts in performing a 
cognitive process, then the mind is extended in performing this cognitive process. (2) 
Parts of a cognitive process external to the brain are functionally equivalent to the parts 
of a cognitive process inside the brain via the use of language, symbols, etc. under 
computationalism. (3) External parts function in conjunction with internal parts in 
performing a cognitive process via exograms. (4) Therefore, the mind is extended in 
exograms. 
 
First, a description of computationalism from Gualtiero Piccinini: “computational 
functionalism says that the mind is the software of the brain (or any functionally 
equivalent system; I will omit this qualification from now on). Taken at face value, this 
slogan draws an analogy between the mind and the software of ordinary, program-
controlled computers. But the same slogan is often understood to suggest, more 
modestly, that the mind is the computational organization of the brain—or that mental 
states are computational states—without the implication that such a computational 
organization is that of a program-controlled computer.”26 This view is in the same spirit 
of microfunctionalism, that is something is functionally equivalent to a mind if and 
only if the individual processes for thought are functionally equivalent.27 In other 
words, a mind is like a computer in that it performs cognitive functions. It does so, at a 
fine-grained level, much like a computer in that it accomplishes this algorithmically. 
So, a brain computes by a series of algorithms, individually composed of if-then 
statements, each of which feeds into another, which eventually leads to the correct 
solution or desired effect. The path between algorithms is called a credit assignment 
                                                          
25 For a similar argument before Clark and Chalmers proposed the Extended Mind Thesis, see 
Robert A. Wilson, “Wide Computationalism,” Mind, Volume 103, Number 411 (July 1994): 351-
372. 
26 Gualtiero Piccinini, “The Mind as Neural Software? Understanding Functionalism, 
Computationalism, and Computational Functionalism,”Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research Volume 81, Number 2 (September, 2010): 271. 
27 Michael Wheeler, “In Defense of Extended Functionalism,”The Extended Mind, edited by 
Richard Menary, (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2010): 259. 
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path as it tracks which algorithm is assigned by the end of previous algorithm.28 I will 
call the act of feeding an output of an algorithm to another algorithm as an input 
“assigning.” This is a functional view of the mind which takes the function of the brain 
to a smaller level. It does not only think, but it thinks in a computational way. It views 
functionalism as true on a “micro” level. The main appeal to this idea is there are 
similarities between the brain and the computer such that artificial intelligence is a real 
possibility. 
 
If we take the internal brain, we can see that an engram is a series of assignments. One 
grouping of neurons makes up the storage of a concept which, if activated, then 
activates another group of neurons in an engram which physiologically, and to a lesser 
extent phenomenologically, recreates a memory which in turn activates some emotional 
grouping of neurons. These firings are not all of one material type, either. The neurons 
in the emotional center activate using a different neurotransmitter than those in an 
engram area.29 In the end, all these cognitive parts in the brain are just assignments, 
assigning from one neuron or neuronal area to another. 
 
If we view language semiotically, assigning is also essentially all language does. There 
exists syntax, which is much like the sequence of neurons. There exist meanings and 
concepts embedded in people or other written works, to which the individual words 
assign. If we do the same with paintings, they assign to historical context and other 
symbolic meaning.  
 
By viewing the mind internal to the brain, we get a series of assignments. Exograms 
external to the brain/body is also a part of that assignment path (just using photons as a 
neurotransmitter).  If we write something sensical on paper, it will assign to places 
within the brain which activate that concept and so on. Writing it captures the concept 
just like an engram, and the cultural change that works on languages also works within 
the brain, shaping it differently. Individual brains store parts of these within cultures, 
but meanings in language are independent of any single brain. In the greater context of 
language within culture, brains act like the neurons within the brain. 
 
If we view language as something not semiotic, we still get something nonderivatively 
cognitive, like the theory proposed by Stephen J. Cowley where language is distributed 
among society and does nothing more than give the feeling of thought.30 Such a move 
does not let the cognitive mark objector off the hook, as cognition just is language and 
                                                          
28 Derek Sleeman, Pat Langley, and Tom M. Mitchell, “Learning from Solution Paths: An 
Approach to the Credit Assignment Problem,” AI Magazine, Volume 3, Number 2 (1982): 49. 
29 Josselyn et al., “Finding the Engram,” 522-531. 
30 Stephen J. Cowley, "Distributed Language and Dynamics," Pragmatics and Cognition, 
Volume 17, Number 3 (December, 2009), 495-508. 
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language is extended. However, such a view moves away from anything computational 
about cognition. 
 
I understand the appeal to not claim that the mind is always extended in this way for the 
sake of cognitive science, but cognitive science does not need this view. There are 
already different studies in different kinds within the brain, like the difference between 
the functioning of the frontal cortex and the amygdala. Cognitive science does not need 
a restricted view of the mind to carry on. In fact, there have been suggestions within the 
cognitive science community to look at cognition as socially extended.31 
 
In conclusion, John Sutton’s interdisciplinary approach to the extended mind promotes 
a complementary view of cognition, showing that historically we already have used 
external memory stores internal to the brain. Exograms hold to a closer examination of 
the way memory works in the mind. Moreover, when taking this approach, we see that 
on a smaller level language functions like neuronal structures and produces cognitive 
function through exograms. This means that, even if we use a more fine-grained 
approach in determining whether the mind is extended, there is nothing unique to the 
internal brain which should preclude it from being extended. And, since language 
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